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The Andean Trade Preference Act: Drug Suppressant
or Economic Stimulant?
Diane L. Haagenson
The United States has been fighting the importation of
drugs since the nineteenth century.' The international narcotics
trade, however, has been a major United States foreign policy
concern only for the last fifteen to twenty years. 2 The United
States' current emphasis on international drug control appears
to be a result of the perceived threat that domestic increases in
drug consumption and drug-related crime pose to national secur-
ity.3 In recent decades, the United States' international drug
1. The first federal attempt to control drug abuse was the Act of February
23, 1887, ch. 210, 24 Stat. 409, which banned the importation of opium into the
United States by Chinese subjects and criminalized participation of United
States citizens in opium traffic in China. Harry Hogan & Charles Doyle, The
Federal Response. A Growing Role, CONG. RES. SERV. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at
11. In 1914, Congress passed the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-
223, 38 Stat. 785, which continued as the primary drug control statute until 1970.
Hogan & Doyle, supra, at 11. This Act required registration with the IRS by
anyone dealing with narcotics and taxed all transactions involving a controlled
drug, except those administered by a physician. Id In 1970, Congress enacted
the Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) and the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1285
(1970), which made significant changes in the system of punishment for drug
violations and increased regulation of the pharmaceutical industry. Hogan &
Doyle, supra, at 12.
2. In 1984, enactment of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2168, marked the first serious attempt by the United
States to combat international drug trafficking through penal legislation. See
Hogan & Doyle, supra note 1, at 12. This Act increased the level of penalties for
drug trafficking offenses and attempted to restrict the international flow of cur-
rency, which is an indication of the operation of international drug cartels. Id
In 1986, the U.S. Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570,
100 Stat. 3207 (1986), the most wide ranging narcotics control legislation since
the Controlled Substances Act. Id The Act introduced criminal penalties for
money laundering and authorized the use of United States armed forces to en-
force U.S. anti-drug criminal laws extraterritorially. The Act also increased
funding for United States treatment and rehabilitation programs and estab-
lished grants to state and local enforcement agencies for local drug enforce-
ment. Id
3. See generally STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON TERRORISM, NARCOTICS
AND INT'L OPERATIONS, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON DRUGS, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY 11 (S. Print No. 165 (1988)).
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control policy has emphasized increased criminal penalties and
military aid to fight drug traffickers,4 rather than addressing
some of the pressures U.S. practices place on developing coun-
tries to produce narcotics, such as tariffs and subsidies on vari-
ous cash crops.5
In January 1990, President George Bush issued a national
drug control strategy that calls for increased international coop-
eration against drug production, trafficking and abuse.6 This ap-
4. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
5. For example, on September 27, 1991, U.S. Trade Representative Carla
A. Hills limited the level of lower duty or duty-free sugar imports to 1,385,000
metric tons, raw value, announcing that any amount above that quota would be
subject to the higher duty of 16 cents per pound. USDA, USTR Announce
Sugar Import Quotas, Allocations for 1991-1992, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1434
(Oct. 2, 1991). The United States currently maintains similar import restric-
tions on other Andean products including cut flowers, zinc, seafood, and fruits
and vegetables. Bernard W. Aronson, Andean Trade Preference Act Essential
to Combating Narcotics Trnffc, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, Aug. 5, 1991.
All of these products are primary commodities (i.e., they have not undergone
manufacturing). More than 90% of Bolivian and Ecuadorian exports and 75% of
Colombian and Peruvian exports are primary commodities. Id. These restric-
tive tariffs thus prevent most Andean exports from entry into the United
States. As a result, Andean farmers are forced to grow illegitimate, tariff-free
products. Colombian Minister of Foreign Commerce Juan Manuel Santos com-
plained about continuing United States tariffs on flower imports, some leather
products, oil and its derivatives, and print and poplin cotton fabrics, stating, "[i]t
is worrisome to us that while developing countries, especially in Latin America,
have taken all kinds of measures to liberalize trade and leave behind protec-
tionism, the industrialized countries seem to be more and more entrenched in
programs of subsidies and tariff restrictions. To us this situation is like the rev-
erend who doesn't practice what he preaches." Latin America: Private Sector
Group Focuses on Expanding U.S.-Colombia Trade, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
284 (Feb. 12, 1992). Similarly, Colombian Foreign Commerce Minister Juan
Camilo Santos commented on the United States setting quotas for poplin-type
cotton cloth and cotton print imports stating, "[wie think the U.S. call to estab-
lish quotas is restrictive and belies the notion of establishing free market poli-
tics between Colombia and the United States." Textiles: Colombia to Continue
Talks with U.S. on Quotas for Cotton Textile Imports, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
393 (Mar. 4, 1992).
6. International Narcotics Control, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, July
15, 1991. President Bush's National Drug Control Strategy provides for:
[i]ncreased economic, military, and law enforcement assistance to Co-
lombia, Peru, and Bolivia; [e]xpanded US-Mexican cooperation in drug
enforcement, 'money laundering' disruption, and demand reduction
programs; [c]ontinued U.S. support for law enforcement and judicial
programs in South American producer and transit countries, including
Ecuador, Venezuela, Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile; [c]ontinued law
enforcement and intelligence programs with Central American and
Caribbean nations; [d]evelopment of an international strategy focused
on opium and heroin; [b]roadened domestic and foreign efforts to
counter international money laundering activities; [e]xpanded efforts
to reduce the illegal manufacture and shipment of chemicals essential
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proach marks the first attempt by the United States to use
economic aid in addition to military aid to fight the war on
drugs. 7
A crucial part of President Bush's strategy is its increased
emphasis on cooperative efforts with the Andean nations, which
produce virtually all of the cocaine sold in the United States.8
On November 1, 1989, President Bush announced the Andean
Trade Initiative I, his first package of trade measures designed to
help the Andean countries through both bilateral and multilat-
eral measures.9 The bilateral measures enhanced the benefits
the Andean countries enjoy under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) 10 and provided technical assistance to these
nations." Multilateral efforts consisted of a July 1990 meeting
to illicit drug production; [p]romotion of international law enforcement
cooperation through mutual legal assistance treaties and the pursuit of
anti-drug initiatives at international forums; and [u]se of economic
assistance to foster crop substitution and developmental programs.
'I.
7. See supra notes 1 and 2.
8. Richard L. Berke, US. Drug Strategy is Attacked at House Hearing,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1989, at A18. The Andean countries covered by the Andean
Trade Preference Act are Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. President Bush
Transmits Proposal to Grant Duty-Free Status to Certain Andean Imports, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1538 (Oct. 10, 1990) [hereinafter Bush Transmits
Proposal.
9. The Andean Trade Preference Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 661 Before
the Subcomm. on Trade of the House of Representatives Comm. on Ways and
Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991) (statement of Carla A. Hills, United States
Trade Representative) [hereinafter Statement of Carla Hills].
10. The GSP program is a temporary program designed to offer duty-free
entry to certain products that are shipped directly from beneficiary countries
which add at least 35% to the value of the entering products. U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, PuB. No. 2432, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF THE CARIBBEAN
BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT ON U.S. INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMERS, 6TH RE.
PORT, 1990, at 1-5 (Sept. 1991). The current GSP program has been in effect
since January 4, 1985, and is scheduled to expire on July 4, 1993. Id. at 1-5 n.31.
The Andean Trade Initiative I enhanced the benefits the Andean countries
enjoy under the GSP by accelerating the implementation of their 1989 Annual
Review, commencing the first-ever Special Review, and including more Andean
products in the 1990 Annual Review. Statement of Carla Hills, supra note 9, at
3. Those countries that are beneficiaries under the GSP must have an annual
product review. Trade Policy: US. to Send Delegation to Czechoslovakia to Be-
gin Trade, Investment Talks, Hills Says, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 297 (Feb. 28,
1990). The special review considers GSP benefits on a product-by-product basis
on a separate track from the annual review. Id. These enhancements have ad-
ded to the GSP program over 120 products from the Andean countries valued at
approximately $100 million in annual exports to the United States. Statement
of Carla Hills, supra note 9, at 3. "Now that these countries have GSP benefits
for these products, the value of trade could expand beyond the $100 million
figure." Id.
11. Statement of Carla Hills, supra note 9, at 4. During the period from
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of senior officials from the European Community, Canada and
Japan to discuss ways to help the Andean countries improve
their trade performance. 12
On July 23, 1990, President Bush announced the Andean
Trade Initiative II, a second package of trade measures for the
Andean nations.13 This package builds on the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative, which President Bush presented on June
27, 1990.14 Its purpose is to fulfill the commitment the president
made at the Cartagena Summit 5 to expand economic alterna-
tives for the Andean countries in order to combat drug produc-
tion.16 The Andean Trade Initiative II included two major
components: expanded agricultural development assistance17
and a special access preference regime.' 8
President Bush submitted the special access provision to
Congress on October 5, 199019 and signed into law this proposal,
the Andean Trade Preference Act, on December 4, 1991.20 The
February 5 through February 23, 1990, each of the Andean capitals held techni-
cal seminars to explain to private sector and government officials the climate
and conditions for conducting business with the United States. Id. Addition-
ally, the USTR organized and hosted a trade and investment workshop from
July 9 through July 13, 1990, in response to requests from Andean governments
for continued assistance to Andean industries seeking to conduct business in the
United States. Id.
12. Id. at 5. Since that meeting, the EC has enhanced access under its GSP
program for a variety of products from the Andean region. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 5-6. The purpose of the Enterprise for Americas Initiative is to
improve the lives of the people of Latin America and the Caribbean by promot-
ing market-oriented reforms, economic growth, debt reduction, investment re-
forms, community-based conservation and sustainable use of the environment.
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, Pub. L. No. 101-624,104 Stat. 3658 (1990),
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1738(a)-(m) (Supp. II 1990).
15. In February 1990, leaders of the four Andean nations and the United
States met in Cartagena, Colombia to discuss ways of eradicating the cocaine
economy in the Andean nations. Latin America: USTR Hills Calls on Congress
to Approve Measure Aimed at Boosting Andean Trade, 8 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1153 (July 31, 1991).
16. Statement of Carla Hills, supra note 9, at 5-6.
17. Id. at 6-7. The goal of the agricultural development assistance program
is to promote trade in those products that can be grown in the Andean countries
and have a potential market in the United States. Id. at 7. Between September
and December 1990, an interagency team headed by Ambassador Edwin Corr
visited the Andean nations in an attempt to identify the obstacles facing the
region's agricultural production and the barriers constraining its exports to the
United States. Id. at 6-7.
18. Id. at 6.
19. Bush Transmits Proposal, supra note 8, at 1538.
20. Andean Trade Preference Act, Pub. L. No. 102-182, 105 Stat. 1244, codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3201-06 (Supp. 1992).
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Act provides duty-free treatment to imports into the United
States of eligible articles from designated Andean countries.2 '
The purpose of the Act is to give Andean countries trade bene-
fits comparable to those that Caribbean countries receive under
the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI),22 which President Ronald
Reagan introduced in 1982 to address the economic and political
instability facing Caribbean countries.2s Congress enacted the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) to achieve
the goals of the CBI.2 4
This article contends that the CBERA is not a proper model
for the Andean Trade Preference Act. Part I provides a brief
background on the structures of the two Acts. Part II argues
that the CBERA is a poor model for the Andean Trade Prefer-
ence Act because the CBERA was designed to achieve different
goals and has contravened, rather that achieved, its objectives.
Part III suggests modifications to the Andean Trade Preference
Act that would make it an effective weapon in the war on drugs.
I. THE STRUCTURES OF THE ANDEAN TRADE
PREFERENCE ACT AND THE CBERA
The Andean Trade Preference Act is virtually identical to
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. Both Acts author-
ize the President to grant duty-free treatment to eligible prod-
ucts from beneficiary countries.25
The two Acts limit the countries eligible for tariff prefer-
ences by geography2 6 and by provision of nearly identical guide-
lines the President must follow in determining whether to
21. Id See specifically 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203 (Supp. 1992) (discussing qualifi-
cations for eligible articles).
22. Statement of Carla Hills, supra note 9, at 7.
23. H.R. REP. No. 266, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983).
24. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67,97 Stat. 384
(1983) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-06 (Supp. II 1990)).
25. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3201 (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19
U.S.C. § 2701 (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
26. Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru are eligible for designation as a
beneficiary country under the Andean Trade Preference Act. 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 3202(b) (Supp. 1992). The CBERA limits the countries eligible for designation
as a beneficiary country to the following- Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua,
Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad and
Tobago, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, the Netherland Antilles, Saint Chris-
topher-Nevis, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the British Virgin Islands. 19
U.S.C. § 2702(b) (Supp. II 1990).
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designate a country as a beneficiary under the respective Act.27
Both Acts authorize the President to withdraw or suspend a
country's beneficiary designation or duty-free treatment of a
particular product if warranted by changed circumstances. 2 s
27. Under the Andean Trade Preference Act and CBERA, a country or
territory cannot be designated a beneficiary country if that country: (1) is a
communist country; (2) has nationalized or expropriated U.S. property, includ-
ing any patent, trademark, or other intellectual property without compensation
or submission to arbitration; (3) fails to recognize arbitral awards in favor of
U.S. citizens; (4) affords preferential tariff treatment to products of other devel-
oped countries that has or is likely to have a significantly adverse effect on U.S.
commerce; (5) broadcasts U.S. copyrighted material without the owner's con-
sent; (6) has not signed an extradition agreement with the United States; or (7)
has not or is not taking steps to afford internationally recognized workers
rights. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3202(c) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19
U.S.C. § 2702(b) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
Failure of a country to meet the first, second, third, fifth, or seventh crite-
ria will not, however, "prevent the designation of any country as a beneficiary
country under [either] Act if the President determines that such designation
will be in the national economic or security interest of the United States and
reports such determination to the Congress with his reasons therefor." 19
U.S.C.A. § 3202(c) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
Both Acts also enumerate several factors that the president must consider
in determining whether to designate a particular country as a beneficiary coun-
try. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3202(d) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19
U.S.C. § 2702(c) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA). These factors are: (1) the country's
desire to be designated; (2) economic conditions and living standards in the
country; (3) the extent to which the country assures that it will provide the
United States reasonable access to its markets and basic commodity resources;
(4) the degree to which the country follows the generally accepted rules of in-
ternational trade established under the GATT, as well as applicable trade
agreements approved under section 2(a) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979;
(5) the degree to which the country uses export subsidies or imposes other
forms of export performance requirements or local content requirements which
distort international trade; (6) the degree to which the country's trade policies
contribute to the revitalization of the region; (7) the degree to which the coun-
try is undertaking self-help measures to promote its own economic develop-
ment; (8) the degree to which the country is taking steps to afford to workers in
that country internationally recognized worker rights; (9) the extent to which
the country provides adequate and effective means for foreign nationals to se-
cure and enforce intellectual property rights; (10) the extent to which the coun-
try prohibits its nationals from broadcasting copyrighted material including
films or other television materials belonging to U.S. copyright owners without
their express consent; and (11) the extent to which the country is prepared to
cooperate with the United States in the administration of the provisions of each
Act. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3202(d) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19
U.S.C. § 2702(c) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA). The Andean Trade Preference also
lists an additional requirement: the degree to which the country has met the
narcotics cooperation certification criteria set forth in section 2291(h)(2)(A) of
Title 22. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3202(d) (Supp. 1992).
28. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3202(e) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19
U.S.C. § 2702(e) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
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The sole difference in the criteria for designation under the two
Acts is that the Andean Trade Preference Act alone requires the
President to consider the degree to which the country has met
the narcotics cooperation certification criteria set forth in the
Foreign Assistance Act.-9
Each Act limits the products eligible for duty-free treat-
ment to articles which are the growth, product or manufacture
of a beneficiary country,3° with the following requirements:3l
first, the article must be imported directly from a beneficiary
country into the customs territory of the United States;32 second,
the sum of cost or value of materials produced in a beneficiary
country or countries plus the direct costs of processing opera-
tions performed in a beneficiary country or countries must con-
stitute at least thirty-five percent of the article's value at the
time of its entry into the United States.33 Under either Act, up
to fifteen percent of the total value of the article that is attribu-
table to Puerto Rico or the United States Virgin Islands, may
count toward this thirty-five percent requirement.34 The
CBERA also includes two minor provisions relating to Puerto
Rico, which are not listed in the Andean Trade Preference Act.35
29. See supra note 27.
30. An article is not the growth, product, or manufacture of a beneficiary
country by virtue of mere combining or packaging operations, or dilution with
water or any other substance that does not materially alter the characteristic of
the article. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(a)(2) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference
Act); 19 U.S.C. § 2 703(a)(2) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
31. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(a) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19
U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
32. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference
Act); 19 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(1)(A) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
33. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference
Act); 19 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA). The Andean Trade
Preference Act also considers the direct costs incurred in a beneficiary country
under the CBERA in determining whether the 35% requirement has been met.
19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(a)(1) (Supp. 1992).
34. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(a)(1) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act);
19 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(1) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
35. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(4)-(5) (Supp. II 1990). Section 2703(a)(4) provides
that the products of a beneficiary that are imported directly from any benefici-
ary country into Puerto Rico may be entered under bond for processing or use
in manufacturing in Puerto Rico. A duty will not be imposed on the withdrawal
from warehouse of the product of such processing or manufacturing if, at the
time of withdrawal, the product meets the requirements of § 2703(a)(1)(B) (see
supra text accompanying note 33). Section 2703(a)(5) provides that duty-free
treatment shall apply to an article (other than an article listed under § 2703(b))
which is the growth, product, or manufacture of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico if (1) the article is imported directly from the beneficiary country into the
customs territory of the United States, (2) the article was in any way improved
in value or condition in a beneficiary country, and (3) if any materials are added
1992]
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The Andean Trade Preference Act and CBERA each pre-
clude certain product categories from duty-free treatment. Spe-
cifically, both Acts exclude: (1) textile and apparel articles
subject to textile agreements;36 (2) footwear not designated as
eligible under the Generalized System of Preferences;37 (3) tuna,
prepared or preserved in any manner, in airtight containers;38
(4) certain petroleum or petroleum products;39 (5) certain
watches;4° (6) certain articles which are subject to reduced rates
of duty;41 and (7) certain sugars, syrups, and molasses.42 The
Andean Trade Preference Act, unlike the CBERA, excludes
rum and tafia43 from duty-free treatment.44
to the article in a beneficiary country, such materials are a product of a benefici-
ary country or the United States.
36. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(b)(1) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act);
19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
37. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(b)(2) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act);
19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
38. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(b)(3) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act);
19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(3) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
39. The duty-free treatment provided under either Act does not apply to
petroleum, or any product derived from petroleum in headings 2709 or 2710 of
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) of the United States. 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 3203(b)(4) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(4)
(Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
40. The duty-free treatment provided under each Act does not apply to
"watches and watch parts (including cases, bracelets and straps), of whatever
type including, but not limited to, mechanical, quartz digital or quartz analog, if
such watches or watch parts contain any material which is the product of any
country with respect to which HTS column 2 rates of duty apply." 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 3203(b)(5) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19 U.S.C. § 2703
(b)(5) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
41. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(b)(6) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act)
and 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(6) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA) apply to articles to which
reduced rates of duty apply under § 3203(c) (Andean Trade Preference Act) and
§ 2703(h) (CBERA). See infra note 45 for an explanation of 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 3203(c) (Supp. 1992) and 19 U.S.C. § 2703(h) (Supp. II 1990).
42. The duty-free treatment provided for under the Andean Trade Prefer-
ence Act does not apply to sugars, syrups, and molasses classified in subhead-
ings 1701.11.03, 1701.12.02, 1701.99.02, 1702.90.32, 1806.10.42, and 2106.90.12 of the
HTS. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(b)(7) (Supp. 1992). Special monitoring and suspension
provisions pertain to imports of sugar, syrup and molasses from beneficiary
countries under the CBERA. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(c)-(d) (Supp. II 1990). While the
Andean Trade Preference Act and the CBERA place sugar, syrup and molasses
in different provisions, the two Acts actually prescribe identical duty treatment
for these products. H.R. REP. No. 337, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1991).
43. Tafia is a low quality alcohol made from impure molasses or other
sugar cane residue, and is not considered a true rum. 10 THE NEW ENCYCLOPE-
DIA BRITANNICA 238 (15th ed. 1989).
44. The duty-free treatment provided for under the Andean Trade Prefer-
ence Act does not apply to rum and tafia classified in subheading 2208.40.00 of
the HTS. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(b)(8) (Supp. 1992).
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Each Act mandates reduced rates of duty on certain articles
excluded from duty-free treatment. The Andean Trade Prefer-
ence Act and CBERA require the president to reduce duty rates
on handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves, and leather wear-
ing apparel that are produced by beneficiary countries and not
designated on August 5, 1983, as eligible articles under the Gen-
eralized System of Preferences.45
Each Act includes two provisions that grant import relief
from the duty-free treatment accorded products under the re-
spective Act. Both the Andean Trade Preference Act and
CBERA authorize the President to suspend duty-free treatment
and declare a duty rate on any eligible article if the action is
proclaimed as import relief under the Trade Act of 1974 or for
national security reasons under section 232 of the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962.46 Additionally, both Acts permit a U.S. indus-
try claiming to suffer injuries from the imports of a beneficiary
country's perishable products47 to file a petition with the Secre-
tary of Agriculture requesting emergency relief if the petition
has already been filed with the International Trade Commission
45. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(c) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19
U.S.C. § 2703(h) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA). Each Act reduces the tariffs on cer-
tain leather-related products by 80%, implemented over a five-year period with
the maximum cut limited to 2.5% ad valorem. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(c)(2) (Supp.
1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2) (Supp. II 1990)
(CBERA). This reduction is in addition to any reduction that may be pro-
claimed by the President in order to implement trade agreements entered into
under the Uruguay Round. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(c)(3) (Supp. 1992) (Andean
Trade Preference Act); 19 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(3) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA). If,
however, the proclaimed reduction is less than 1.5% ad valorem, the total reduc-
tion cannot exceed 3.5% ad valorem. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(c)(3) (Supp. 1992) (An-
dean Trade Preference Act); 19 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(3) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
If, on the other hand, the proclaimed reduction is 1.5% ad valorem or greater,
the total reduction cannot exceed the proclaimed reduction plus 1% ad valorem.
I&
46. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(d) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19
U.S.C. § 2703(e) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
47. The term "perishable product" means (A) live plants and fresh cut
flowers provided for in chapter 6 of the HTS; (B) fresh or chilled vegetables
provided for in headings 0701 through 0709 (except subheading 0709.52.00) and
heading 0714 of the HTS; (C) fresh fruit provided for in subheadings 0804.20
through 0810.90 (except citrons of subheadings 0805.90.00, tamarinds and kiwi
fruit of subheading 0810.90.20, and cashew apples, mameyes colorados, sapodil-
las, soursops and sweetsops of subheading 0810.90.40) of the HTS; or (D) con-
centrated citrus fruit juice provided for in subheadings 2009.11.00, 2009.19.40,
2009.20.40, 2009.30.20, and 2009.30.60 of the HTS. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(e)(5) (Supp.
1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(5) (Supp. II 1990)
(CBERA).
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(ITC).48 Each Act authorizes the President to withdraw duty-
free treatment of such products if the Secretary recommends
that emergency action is necessary.49
Finally, the Andean Trade Preference Act and CBERA in-
clude provisions designed to monitor their impact. Each Act re-
quires the ITC to report to Congress its economic impact on
United States industries and consumers.se The Andean Trade
Preference Act, however, additionally requires that the ITC's
report include an assessment of the Act's effectiveness in pro-
moting drug-related crop eradication and crop substitution in
beneficiary countries. 51 Furthermore, both Acts require the
Secretary of Labor to review and analyze the impact of the re-
spective Act on United States labor.52
II. THE CBERA AS A MODEL FOR THE ANDEAN
TRADE PREFERENCE ACT
The CBERA is not a proper model for the Andean Trade
Preference Act. The goals underlying the CBERA are distinct
from those of the Andean Trade Preference Act. Furthermore,
the CBERA has failed to achieve its objective of stabilizing the
Caribbean Basin nations' economies. Instead, the CBERA has
helped the United States economy at the expense of the in-
tended beneficiary countries.
A. THE PURPOSES OF THE Acrs ARE DIFFERENT
The most notable difference between the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act and the Andean Trade Preference Act
is their dissimilar objectives. This disparity suggests that the
two Acts should not share a common structure.
Congress enacted the CBERA in response to the economic
crisis in the Caribbean Basin nations. President Reagan had
called attention to the crisis by announcing the Caribbean Basin
48. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(e)(1) (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act);
19 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1) (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
49. The President must make a determination whether or not to take such
action within seven days after receiving a recommendation from the Secretary
of Agriculture to take emergency action. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3203(e)(3) (Supp. 1992)
(Andean Trade Preference Act); 19 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(3) (Supp. II 1990)
(CBERA).
50. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3204 (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19
U.S.C. § 2704 (Supp. II 1990) (CBERA).
51. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3204 (Supp. 1992).
52. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3205 (Supp. 1992) (Andean Trade Preference Act); 19
U.S.C. § 2705 (Supp. 1 1990) (CBERA).
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Initiative in February of 198253 and Congress responded by pass-
ing the CBERA.54 Congress cited deeply rooted structural
problems, huge balance-of-payments deficits, high unemploy-
ment, and declining growth as some of the causes of this eco-
nomic crisis. 5
The CBERA was designed as a general tool to safeguard the
political, social and economic stability of the Caribbean Basin
nations.s6 The Act does not focus on aiding one specific area of
the economy, but attempts to treat the problem comprehen-
sively. Economic growth in the Caribbean Basin nations was in-
tended to improve their political and social stability.57
Although the Andean Trade Preference Act also provides
trade advantages, its primary purpose is quite different from
that of the CBERA. The Andean Trade Preference Act was
designed to provide Andean farmers with economic alternatives
to growing illegal drugs.-s To achieve this goal, the Act seeks to
expand economic alternatives for Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and
Ecuador by granting special tariff preferences to products from
those countries for a limited period of time.5 9
Representative Philip Crane stated that he introduced the
Andean Trade Preference Act on behalf of the administration
because he believed the best way to solve the narcotics problems
facing Latin America was to place the emphasis on "trade rather
than aid."'6 Crane argued that eliminating duties on a number
of products from the Andean region would encourage the devel-
53. H.R. REP. No. 266, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1983).
54. On August 20, 1990, President George Bush extended the CBI program
indefinitely when he signed into law the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act of 1990, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-06 (Supp. II 1990).
55. H.R. REP. No. 266, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1983).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Bush Transmits Proposal, supra note 8, at 1538. In this respect, the
Andean Trade Preference Act represents U.S. enlightened self-interest; a de-
crease in drugs grown in the Andes translates into a decrease in drugs available
for sale in the United States.
59. Section 3206 of the Andean Trade Preference Act states that this duty-
free treatment shall not remain in effect more than 10 years after December 4,
1991. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3206 (Supp. 1992).
60. 137 CONG. REc. H10,650 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Crane). Likewise, Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-Ameri-
can Affairs stated that "[t]he issue in this legislation, then, goes far beyond
trade." Bernard W. Aronson, Andean Trade Preference Act- Essential to Com-
bating Narcotics Trrfftc, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, Aug. 5,1991. "Passing
the Andean Trade Preference Act means keeping our end of a bargain with our
partners in the war on drugs - partners on the front lines who have sacrificed a
great deal and who face tremendous social and economic difficulties." Id.
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opment of legitimate crops, allowing Andean farmers to escape
their dependence on the cocaine economy. 61 Crane stressed
that, "despite excessive violence, massive poverty, and spreading
disease, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have devoted pre-
cious financial and human resources to their efforts to rid their
region of the drug scourge."6 2 Expanding trade opportunities for
the Andean region demonstrates the United States' commitment
to the Andean nations in the war on drugs and serves as a formal
recognition of their many sacrifices. 63
The comprehensive approach of the CBERA makes it a poor
model for the Andean Trade Preference Act, which must be
more focused. The Andean Trade Preference Act must ensure
that Andean farmers have alternatives to growing drugs, and
cannot simply hope that a general improvement in the econo-
mies of Andean nations will produce legitimate farming alterna-
tives. The objectives of the Andean Trade Preference Act
require that the Act address the root of the problem, rather than
following the CBERA's lead in addressing a problem generally.
B. THE CBERA HAS FAILED TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES
Observers hold differing opinions on whether the Caribbean
Basin Initiative has been successful in accomplishing its goal of
political and economic stability in the Caribbean Basin nations.
Within the U.S. Administration, support for the CBI has been
high. President Bush stated that "[s]ince its inception in 1983,
the [Caribbean Basin Initiative] has promoted stability, security,
and the movement to democracy and free markets that we now
celebrate not only in this hemisphere but around the world."
4
He explained that the success of the CBI prompted his efforts to
seek legislation for limited-duration CBI-like trade preferences
for the Andean countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and
Peru.65
61. 137 CONG. REc. H10,650 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Crane).
62. Id.
63. Id. In transmitting the proposal to Congress, President Bush noted
that the Andean nations are engaged in a "serious struggle" to combat illegal
narcotics trafficking and that it is "incumbent" on the United States to aid An-
dean nations in developing legitimate trading opportunities for their people.
Bush Transmits Proposal, supra note 8, at 1538.
64. Statement by President George Bush on Signing the Customs and
Trade Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Docs. 1266, 1267 (Aug. 20, 1990).
65. Id. Various other officials have commented on the effectiveness of the
Caribbean Basin Initiative. For example, according to Commerce Deputy
Under Secretary for International Trade Administration Roger Wallace, "duty-
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Other observers hold a different viewpoint. Gonzaol Biggs
of the Inter-American Development Bank called the results of
the CBI "disappointing," pointing out that "United States ex-
ports to the [Caribbean Basin] area increased 51 percent, while
Caribbean exports declined 30 percent from 1983 to 1989."6
Myles Frechette, Assistant United States Trade Representative
for Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, disputed this
characterization, attributing the decline in exports to a fall in oil
prices during that period.67
Notwithstanding the differing opinions on the success of the
Caribbean Basin Initiative, recent economic statistics demon-
strate that the economic conditions in Caribbean Basin countries
have not improved and that those countries remain in uncertain
economic and political conditions." The stability and security of
the entire region remain in jeopardy.
Despite claims of the U.S. government, the CBERA has
helped few products enter the United States duty-free. A
United States Department of State report on the CBERA em-
phasized that "the fundamental purpose of the CBI - broaden-
ing and diversifying the production and export base of the region
- is being met, despite [the] decline in overall export earn-
ings." 69 The report cited a forty-eight percent increase in United
States non-petroleum imports from designated CBERA coun-
tries between 1983 and 1989, including a 342% increase in tex-
tiles and clothing.70 This report drew its erroneous conclusion
free access under the CBI has stimulated both U.S. and Caribbean entrepre-
neurship... [and] has lead [sic] to 'significant diversification' of Caribbean ex-
ports from traditional items to non-traditional products." Official Predicts That
Andean Trade Bill Will Pass This Year with Little Opposition, Int'l Trade
Daily (BNA), Apr. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library Intl File. Addi-
tionally, Wallace stated that since the implementation of the CBI program, the
United States has gone from a trade deficit with the Caribbean region to a trade
surplus. Id.
66. Chile, U.S. May be Ready to Negotiate FTA Within Next Two Years,
USTR Official Says, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 576 (Apr. 17, 1991).
67. Id.
68. See infra notes 69-86 and accompanying text.
69. CBI Fails to Boost Regional Exports; Central American Exporters Fare
Better Than Caribbean, LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL REPORT: CARIBBEAN, June
20, 1991, at 7, (quoting a report from the United States Department of State).
70. Id. The Caribbean region reported a 106% increase in United States
imports of textiles, clothing and non-traditional products since 1983, while Cen-
tral America reported an increase of 155%. Id. The actual (customs) value of
such imports from the Caribbean increased US $1.4 billion since 1983, totalling
US $2.8 billion for the period October 1989-September 1990. Id. Specifically,
Jamaica reported a 228% increase in United States imports, the Bahamas a
198% increase, Belize a 133% increase, and Trinidad and Tobago a 42.7% in-
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by ignoring the fact that major Caribbean industries such as tex-
tiles and apparel are specifically excluded from benefits under
the CBERA.71 Thus, the increase in U.S. imports of these prod-
ucts cannot be attributed to the CBERA.72
The steady increase in textile and apparel exports is7s due
mainly to other duty-free and duty-reduction programs such as
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and bilateral
agreements upon which many Caribbean Basin exporters rely to
export their textile and apparel products.74 This is not a discrete
phenomenon. In 1990 less than one-tenth of all of the duty-free
imports from the Caribbean Basin benefited from the CBERA.75
Rather, most of these goods benefited from the most-favored-
nation 76 or GSP duty-free provisions.77 In short, the CBERA is
not responsible for the benefits Caribbean Basin nations receive
for most of their products designated as eligible articles under
the CBERA.
crease. Id Barbados and Guyana, however, reported declines in United States
imports of 84.9% and 24%, respectively. I& In addition, "St. Lucia, recently the
most active of the Eastern Caribbean beneficiaries in the textile and clothing
and non-traditional categories, recorded an increase of 476.5%... in the twelve
months to September 1990." Id St. Lucia's exports of textile and clothing in
non-traditional categories increased from US $5 million in 1983 to US $27 mil-
lion in the twelve months ending September 1990. IdE
71. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
72. The United States could significantly increase the impact of the
CBERA by granting duty-free treatment to textiles and petroleum products. In
1990, textiles and apparel imports were the leading United States import cate-
gory from CBERA countries, totaling $2.0 billion, while imports of petroleum
products, the second largest import category totaled $1.3 billion. U.S. INT'L
TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2432, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF THE CARIB-
BEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT ON U.S. INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMERS,
6TH REPORT, 1990, at 2-9 (Sept. 1991) [hereinafter 1990 CBERA ANNUAL RE.
PORT]. Like textiles and apparel, petroleum products are not eligible for duty-
free treatment under the CBERA. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(4) (Supp. II 1990). Be-
tween these two categories of ineligible imports, textiles and apparel carry the
higher duties. 1990 CBERA ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 2-9. The exclusion of
textiles and apparel, therefore, limits the impact of duty-free treatment under
the CBERA more than the exclusion of petroleum and petroleum products.
73. 1990 CBERA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 72, at 2-9.
74. Id at viii, 2-9.
75. Id at 3-1 to 3-2. Although items entered duty-free were valued at al-
most $5 billion, only $422 million worth of these imports actually benefited
from the CBERA's duty-free treatment provisions. Id at 2-8, 3-2.
76. Id Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
requires most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, providing that any advantage
accorded by a member of GATT "to any product originating in or destined for
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting
parties." GATT art. I:l.
77. 1990 CBERA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 72, at 2-8, 3-2.
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There have been, however, five products - beef, pineapple,
frozen concentrated orange juice, rum, and raw cane sugar -
that consistently have been among the leading items actually
benefiting from the CBERA's duty-free provisions. 78 These
products are traditional products of the Caribbean Basin na-
tions.79 The value of United States imports from these products
that benefited from the CBERA totaled approximately $240 mil-
lion in 1990W - significantly less than the $3.3 billion value of
textile and petroleum products imported from Caribbean na-
tions in 1990.81 The CBERA's duty-free treatment provisions
thus affect only a small percentage of the total value of products
imported by the United States from the Caribbean Basin.
Furthermore, the CBERA has had a more positive effect on
the United States than on the Caribbean Basin nations. The
United States registered an overall trade surplus of $2.1 billion
with countries designated for Caribbean Basin Initiative benefits
in 1990, the fifth consecutive year the United States has regis-
tered a surplus in trade with the Caribbean Basin countries.8 2
The consistently positive United States trade balance with the
Caribbean reflected a 15.6% decline in United States imports
since the CBI program began and a 64.7% surge in United States
exports.s3
This decline in the Caribbean Basin nations trade balance
reflects a corresponding negative effect on the Caribbean na-
tions' economies. The United States trade surplus with the Car-
ibbean Basin nations is not attributable to increased capital
investment in these nations.s 4 The Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act has not, in general, encouraged economic growth
and development in the region.s5 Indeed, the basic problems
that the CBERA was designed to remedy have precluded capital
investment in the Caribbean Basin region. These impediments
include: inadequate infrastructure, political instability, restric-
78. Id at 3-1 to 3-6. Raw cane sugar did not benefit from the CBI in 1989, a
year when it also was eligible for GSP duty-free entry. Id. at 3-1.
79. Id at 2-5.
80. d at 3-3.
81. See supra note 72.
82. 1990 CBERA ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 72, at 2-1 to 2-2. In 1990,
United States exports to the Caribbean Basin countries totaled a record high of
$9.7 billion (an increase of 5.6% over 1989), whereas United States imports from
Caribbean Basin nations in 1990 amounted to $7.6 billion (an increase of 8.3%
over 1989). Id at 2-1.
83. Id, at 2-1.
84. Id at 4-1.
85. Id.
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tions on foreign exchange and profit repatriation, insufficient in-
vestment incentives, and the limited amount of products
produced in the region eligible for duty-free treatment under
the CBERA. 8
The CBERA has failed to achieve its objective of remedying
the economic crisis in the Caribbean Basin nations. The prod-
ucts entitled to duty-free treatment under the Act make up only
a small proportion of all U.S. imports from these nations, and
consist primarily of traditional products. Caribbean economies
have not improved since enactment of the CBERA, and indeed
the Caribbean nations' trade deficit with the United States has
increased. The failure of the CBERA to improve Caribbean
economies casts doubt upon the value of the Act as a model for
the Andean Trade Preference Act, which seeks to aid specific
sectors of the Andean economies.
III. IMPROVING THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE
ACT'S ABILITY TO FIGHT THE DRUG WAR
Like the CBERA, the Andean Trade Preference Act will be
ineffective in promoting economic opportunities and will benefit
the United States at the expense of those it purports to aid.
Most products imported from the Andean nations will enter
under other duty-free programs;8 7 the Act will affect only about
six percent of U.S. imports from Andean nations.88 Addition-
ally, the Act seeks a closer but more exclusive trading relation-
ship with the Andean nations,8 9 creating an unhealthy
dependency on U.S. legal and economic stability. If Congress be-
lieves that economic progress in drug-growing regions will re-
duce the narcotics problem, it must modify the Andean Trade
Preference Act's provisions relating to beneficiary countries,
duty-free trade, and termination of benefits.
A. BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES
While the Andean Trade Preference Act as a whole pur-
ports to aid segments of the Andean economies, the provisions
governing eligibility for beneficiary country status restrict which
86. Id at 4-1 to 4-2.
87. H.R. REP. No. 337, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1991). Total United States
imports from the Andean nations in 1990 were $5.4 billion, of which about $2.3
billion or 43% already enter duty-free (either under most-favored-nation or
GSP treatment). Id
88. Id.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 92-93.
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nations may receive trade benefits. To qualify, Andean nations
must submit to conditions designed to benefit U.S. investors.
These conditions are not only unrelated to the Act's objectives,
but in some cases actually contravene those objectives.
Only those countries which the President designates as ben-
eficiary countries qualify for duty-free treatment under the
Act.9° The Act sets out certain conditions for designation as a
beneficiary country.91 These conditions make it plain that only
those countries which convince the Administration that they are
prepared to provide a risk-free environment for United States
businesses will receive beneficiary status.
For example, a provision of the Act precludes the President
from granting beneficiary status to a country that provides pref-
erential treatment to the products of a developed country other
than the United States.92 This provision directly contravenes
the Act's purpose of encouraging the Andean nations to grow
legitimate rather than drug-related crops.93 It precludes an An-
dean nation from negotiating a bilateral treaty with another de-
veloped nation that would help it to export its legitimate crops
and thus further the Andean Trade Preference Act's goal. Fur-
thermore, this provision coerces the Andean countries into
favoring the United States as a trading partner, rather than al-
lowing the Andean countries to negotiate conditions of trade
with all of their trading partners. Congress should remove this
self-defeating provision from the Act.
Another provision of the Act precludes the President from
granting beneficiary status to a communist country. 94 This re-
quirement should not appear in the Andean Trade Preference
Act, an Act that purports to fight the drug war. If the United
States government believes that trade with drug producing na-
tions will help combat the narcotics problem, it should not dis-
criminate against a country on the basis of its political
orientation. Congress should eliminate this provision from the
90. See supra note 26. On July 6, 1992, the Office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative announced that Bolivia and Colombia were granted beneficiary coun-
try status under the Andean Trade Preference Act. Latin America: Bolivia,
Colombia Will Receive Trade Benefits Under Andean Act, 9 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1173 (July 8, 1992). Ecuador and Peru have not yet been designated as
beneficiary countries under the Act. Id.
91. See supra note 27.
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 27.
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Act to avoid limiting the class of countries eligible for benefici-
ary country status.
Moreover, several of the factors that the President must
consider in determining whether to designate a country as a ben-
eficiary under the Act hinder the Act's purported goal of fight-
ing the war on drugs. The President must consider: (1) the
extent to which the country has assured that it will provide the
United States reasonable access to its markets and basic com-
modity resources, (2) the extent to which the country's laws pro-
vide adequate and effective means for foreign nationals to
enforce exclusive rights in intellectual property, and (3) the ex-
tent to which the country prohibits its nationals from engaging
in unauthorized broadcast of copyrighted material.95 These fac-
tors unnecessarily narrow the class of countries whose econo-
mies will benefit from the Andean Trade Preference Act. Only
those countries that consent to aiding U.S. private investors in
gaining access to Andean markets and in protecting their prod-
ucts will receive beneficiary status. The Andean Trade Prefer-
ence Act was designed to aid Andean farmers in growing
legitimate crops,9 and not to aid United States private investors.
These factors are not in any way related to the Act's goal of
eradicating drug production. Congress should remove these
guidelines from the Act so that the Andean countries seeking
beneficiary status are not required to aid United States private
investment at the expense of their own economy in order to gain
beneficiary status.
The provisions of the current Andean Trade Preference Act
governing eligibility for beneficiary country status are an at-
tempt to cajole Andean nations into favoring foreign private in-
vestment by denying free trade benefits to those who refuse to
do so. To further the Act's goals of reducing drug production,
Congress should remove the coercive elements from the Act.
B. DUTY-FREE TRADE
The categories of products eligible for duty-free treatment
under the Andean Trade Preference Act are too narrow. Only a
small proportion of the United States' total imports from An-
dean nations would be newly eligible for duty-free treatment
under the Andean Trade Preference Act.97 The primary reason
that the Andean Trade Preference Act will have such a minimal
95. See supra note 27.
96. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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effect is that the Act excludes from duty-free treatment goods
the Administration feels need protection from import competi-
tion.98 In order for the Andean Trade Preference Act to be an
effective tool in reducing narcotics trafficking, Congress must
extend duty-free treatment to these products.
In particular, the Act should grant duty-free treatment to
sugar originating from Andean countries. Although sugar is a
main export of the Andean nations,99 the Andean Trade Prefer-
ence Act does nothing to improve the dutiable status of sugar
imported from that region.100 Imported sugar currently is sub-
ject to a two-tier tariff-quota system.1' 1 After sugar imports sur-
pass a threshold quantity, further sugar imports are subject to
the higher duty.10 2 The higher rate effectively denies entry of
any sugar above the lower duty threshold.10 3 Duty-free treat-
ment of sugar would allow Andean farmers to export a much
greater amount of sugar than currently is possible and would
subsequently provide a significant alternative for Andean farm-
ers who produce drug-related crops.104
Congress should also eliminate the restrictions against ac-
cording duty-free treatment to rum. Congress excluded rum
from duty-free treatment under the Andean Trade Preference
98. On January 29, 1991, the date of the introduction of the Andean Trade
Preference Act into the Senate, Senator Dole stated that "[p]roducts which are
particularly import sensitive and are excluded under the CBI are also excluded
under this initiative. These include textiles and apparel, footwear, petroleum
and petroleum products, canned tuna, watches and watch parts." 137 CONG.
REC. S1,222 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole). See also supra
notes 36-44 and accompanying text for a list of items excluded under the Act.
99. See supra note 5.
100. See supra note 42.
101. H.R. REP. No. 337, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1991). The United States
Trade Representative currently allows the Andean nations to import the fol-
lowing amounts of sugar at the lower-tier rate: Bolivia, 10,571 metric tons, or
0.8% of the lower-tariff allocation; Colombia, 31,712 metric tons, 2.4%; Ecuador,
14,535 metric tons, 1.1%; Peru, 54,175 metric tons, 4.1%. Agriculture: USDA,
USTR Announce Sugar Import Quotas, Allocations for 1991-1992, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1434 (Oct. 2, 1991). Additionally, since the Andean nations are ben-
eficiaries of the GSP, the quantity of sugar permitted to enter at the lower-tier
tariff rate is eligible for duty-free treatment under the GSP. H.R. REP. No. 337,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1991). High-tariff sugar imported from the Andean
nations remains subject to the same duty that existed before the passage of the
Andean Trade Preference Act, 16 cents per pound. Id.
102. H.R. REP. No. 337, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1991).
103. Id.
104. Senator Bill Bradley has stated that the domestic sugar program "coun-
ters American foreign policy goals, and undermines our attempts to eradicate
the drug trade." Senate and House Debate Farm Bil, Reject Fkfforts to Cut Sup-
port Price for U.S. Sugar, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1191 (Aug. 1, 1990).
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Act to protect the benefits that Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
and the Caribbean Basin countries receive from Congress with
respect to this product. 0 5 CBERA countries account for ninety
percent of total United States rum imports.106 Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands also depend heavily on revenues from the
rum industry and rebates of federal excise taxes on United
States rum imports,10 7 and are concerned that Andean rum pro-
ducers have cost advantages over Puerto Rican and Virgin Island
rum producers because of their superior natural resources and
excess production capacity.108 Representatives of Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands have lobbied against granting duty-free
treatment to Andean rum.109 In light of this pressure, it is not
surprising that the Administration has denied Andean nations'
petitions for duty-free treatment of rum under the GSP pro-
gram."10 Duty-free treatment of rum under the Andean Trade
Preference Act would provide another alternative to Andean
farmers currently producing drug crops.
Furthermore, the Act excludes a certain class of leather ar-
ticles from duty-free treatment, but reduces the duties assigned
to those articles."' Duty-free treatment of these products
would encourage the building of manufacturing facilities in the
Andean region and contribute to the diversification of Andean
exports. Andean farmers would gain job opportunities. Andean
farmers who want to grow legitimate crops may be unable to
earn enough money to survive because of tariffs applied to ex-
ports to the United States. The elimination of those tariffs may
provide those farmers a meaningful alternative to illegal drug
production.
C. TERMINATION OF BENEFITS
The sections of the Andean Trade Preference Act that need
the most improvement are its suspension- 2 and emergency re-
lief 13 provisions. That which the United States can give to the
Andean nations it also can take away. Obviously, a new Act of
105. H.R. REP. No. 337, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1991).
106. Id,
107. Id
108. Id
109. Id
110. Id As recently as 1990, the United States denied a petition by Colom-
bia for duty-free preferential treatment under the GSP program. Id
111. See supra note 45.
112. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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Congress could repeal the Andean Trade Preference Act. Sev-
eral other avenues, however, allow the United States to with-
draw the Act's unilaterally granted benefits.
First, the United States can suspend the Act's promise of
free trade by re-instituting tariffs if the President determines
that tariffs are necessary to provide import relief or protect the
national security.114 Labor and industry lobbies in the United
States that support protective tariffs on competitive foreign im-
ports are very influential. 115 These groups will pressure Con-
gress and the President to suspend the duty-free status of
competing products.
Similarly, the Act's emergency relief provision could stifle
the Act's goals. Under this provision, the President may, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture, withdraw
duty-free treatment of perishable products. 1 6 A large percent-
age of domestic products that compete with Andean nations' ex-
ports are eligible for emergency relief.117 For example, fresh cut
flowers are Colombia's third largest export 18 and are included
in the category of perishable products eligible for emergency re-
lief.119 Strong lobbying efforts by United States fresh flower la-
bor and industries will undoubtedly influence the determination
as to whether emergency action is appropriate.120
Finally, the Andean Trade Preference Act has no effect on
additional duties that may be imposed under United States anti-
114. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
115. Since 1988 the soybean association has lobbied to ensure that none of
the $20 million in annual United States food aid to Bolivia goes to encourage
soybean production. Greg Rushford, The Drug War vs. Private Interest" Guess
Who Wins?, LEGAL TIMES, June 11, 1990, at 1. Similar lobbying efforts have
been undertaken to protect the fresh cut flower market from Andean competi-
tion. Tim W. Ferguson, Blushing Flowers Shall Rise, With Hybrid Ventures,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1992, at A13. Colombian exports account for a solid major-
ity of United States sales of some popular flowers. Id. Representative Leon
Panetta, the powerful Democrat who represents much of the California grow-
ing area, wants to impose import quotas and require country-of-origin labeling
for every flower arrangement. Id. See also Flowers and Cocaine; U.S. Could
Help Colombian Farmers by Allowing Imports of Chrysanthemums, L.A. DAILY
J. (from the N.Y. TIMES (editorial)), Feb. 21, 1990, at 6 [hereinafter Flowers and
Cocaine]; and Bill Workman, Cheap Foreign Roses Peril US. Growers: Crisis
Linked to Battle Against Cocaine, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 21, 1991, at A18.
116. The emergency relief provision is described supra in notes 48-49 and
accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 5 and 47.
118. Flowers and Cocaine, supra note 115, at 6.
119. See supra note 47.
120. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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dumping or countervailing duty laws.' 2 ' For example, the
United States frequently levies anti-dumping duties on fresh cut
flowers. 122
Although the Andean Trade Preference Act purports to
provide duty-free treatment to imports from Andean nations, in
reality these products can easily fall victim to the Act's suspen-
sion and emergency relief provisions or to U.S. antidumping and
countervailing duty laws. These multiple U.S. escape routes
from the Act's trade provisions undermine the entire Act and
imperil any gains made. Andean farmers will seek security
before switching from drug-related crops to legitimate crops, but
will find none in the tentative U.S. commitment. In order to
make the Act successful, Congress must eliminate or severely
restrict the ability of the United States to withdraw trade bene-
fits as a result of lobbying pressure from domestic industries.
CONCLUSION
The Andean Trade Preference Act has been described by its
sponsors as an economic incentive program to encourage the re-
placement of the narcotics trade with legitimate products. The
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, however, is not a com-
petent model for the Andean Trade Preference Act. The
CBERA was not designed to achieve the goals of the Andean
Trade Preference Act and it has contravened its own purpose of
alleviating the economic crisis in the Caribbean Basin nations.
Congress must amend the Andean Trade Preference Act for
it to be an effective weapon in reducing drug production and
trafficking. The Act's beneficiary country provisions should be
more understanding of the Andean economies and less discrimi-
natory in favor of United States investment. Congress should
extend duty-free treatment to all major exports of the Andean
nations, and especially to exports whose production serves as a
substitute for drug cultivation. Finally, Congress should restrict
the ability of the United States to suspend duty-free treatment
to protect U.S. producers.
Without these changes, the Andean Trade Preference Act is
likely only to hurt the Andean nations. The Act will not aid in
the reduction of narcotics production, but rather will assist
121. H.R. REP. No. 337, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1991).
122. In recent years, the United States has levied antidumping duties
against all four Andean nations. Workman, supra note 115, at A18.
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United States business investment and maintain the economic
predominance of the United States in the western hemisphere at
the expense of the Andean economies.

